




























As a vain yet also effective trace, the sign has the power of destruction because it has the power of abstraction – and thus also the power to construct a new world different from nature’s initial one. (Henri Lefebvre, 1991: 135)

In the work of sociologist and philosopher Henri Lefebvre, abstraction is akin to destruction. Abstraction orders material and mental life in a manner that devalues human experience, Lefebvre continually suggests, and his writing in part explores the spatial traces of this devaluation. In his landmark book The Production of Space, published in French in 1974 and translated into English in 1991, he coins the term ‘abstract space’ to describe the manner in which he understands space to be imagined, produced and lived in contemporary capitalist states. So prevalent as to be invisible, the idea of abstract space is used by Lefebvre to show how space (particularly urban space) is far from a neutral background or a blank container, but rather something that inevitably and powerfully embodies political, ideological and social principles, even if these are rendered invisible.

A way of arranging space both materially and mentally, abstract space is a ‘lens’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 280) ordering the spaces we live in and the ways we think about them, doing so for economic purposes. Capital assigns space value and enters it into a system of commodity exchange through the deployment of a ‘unitary, logistical, operational and quantifying rationality’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 280). This rationality tends towards homogeneity and seeks to erase the felt or intangible distinctions between places, but it reinstates differentiation at the level of hierarchy, fragmenting space into sites of specific use in order to make it increasingly controllable and manageable. Abstract space contains nature in that it brings the natural world under this umbrella of hierarchization and exchange-value by conceiving of it as a commodity and open to exploitation (Lefebvre, 2009a). Rather than being a specific classification of certain spaces, Lefebvre is clear throughout The Production of Space that abstract space is an intention and not a form in and of itself; it is the goal, orientation, or lens of capital production, a spatial ideology at the heart of the prevailing economic system.

This article will examine how the abstraction that Lefebvre identifies as a crucial trait of abstract space can be seen at work within the computer-animated special effects of contemporary Hollywood films, in particular the production of digital spaces and bodies using virtual cinematography. In these animated shots, the capacity of digital technology to reproduce profilmic elements (sets, actors) is demonstrated. Furthermore, virtual cinematography often asserts its ability, over and above the traditional camera apparatus, to surpass physical restrictions. For Mike Jones, such a virtual camera adopts the point of view of the space that it depicts (2007: 237). It does this by shifting the focus of composition from the delimited film frame to the entire space in which a scene is staged, all of this space accessible through lengthy, continuous shots. Jones often describes the virtual camera as ‘omnipotent’ (2007: 226, 238, 240, 241), and it is this trait of spatial mastery that will be under consideration here. Digital animation creates three-dimensional worlds that are highly and dynamically navigable. Yet in functioning as an explicit replacement of a profilmic material reality (albeit often a film set), virtual cinematography re-maps this material reality as a highly controlled commodity. 

Taking its cue from Lefebvre’s focus on space itself, and how the production and representation of space dictate what actions can take place within it, this article will investigate the purposes and consequences of the creation of space by digital means. It will focus upon The Matrix (Andy and Larry Wachowski, 1999) and The Matrix Reloaded (Andy and Larry Wachowski, 2003) due to their positioning within both related promotional materials and wider critical theory as high watermarks in digital imaging methods. In particular, it will argue through a close reading of The Matrix Reloaded that the spaces created by virtual cinematography, with their mechanisms of quantification and totalization, can be fruitfully read as expressions of Lefebvre’s abstract space of capitalist production, revealing digital animation’s potential to express ideologies of abstraction and control. In doing so it seeks to analyze some of the consequences of the increasing use of digital animation within contemporary film.

Bullet-time and spatial dislocation

Virtual cinematography exists alongside profilmic content, replacing it when limitations of real-world physics and bodily capacity become too great. This is different to the way that digital animated features use computer-generated imagery (CGI). As Leon Gurevitch argues, in films like Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995) and Cars (John Lasseter and Joe Ranft, 2006) every item included within the frame is a computer-designed product, and the space in which they are placed has moreover been ‘specifically fabricated on an industrial scale for consumption by the viewer’ (2012: 136). This logic holds true for the highly determined images of virtual cinematography, but rather than present fictional spaces that stand for and as themselves (as in digital animated films), virtual cinematography in The Matrix Reloaded and elsewhere points to indexical spaces, people and objects whose presence is confirmed and constituted through their accompanying depiction by profilmic cinematography. Under consideration here is not just the capacity to cut between footage shot on a stage with indexical performers, and footage generated by a computer that simulates these elements, but also, and more importantly, the illusion of totality provided by the latter. Constructed as an entirely quantified environment, the space of virtual cinematography may seem to evoke detached sciences of visual knowledge, but as geographer Derek Gregory (1994) suggests, these sciences, with their enframing of the world-as-exhibition, are ideological operations. Though they seem to be detached and rational, such dazzling displays have to be ‘produced from somewhere’ (Gregory, 1994: 65, emphasis in original). 

Virtual cinematography, as will be shown, presupposes that profilmic space (and everything populating it) can be both abstracted and digitally reproduced. This is itself a central narrative conceit of The Matrix franchise, and though this article will principally be concerned with the manner in which this spatial reproduction occurs in the virtual cinematography of The Matrix Reloaded, it is necessary to contextualize this discussion with analysis of so-called ‘bullet-time’ and its use in The Matrix. Along with a wider cycle of films that questioned the dangers of virtual worlds in the late 1990s – including as Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998), eXistenZ (David Cronenberg, 1999) and The Thirteenth Floor (Josef Rusnak, 1999) – The Matrix emphasized the capacity of digital technology to represent space. In the film, a computer hacker named Neo (Keanu Reeves) discovers he is an unwilling inhabitant of a digital recreation of the world, his real body being harvested for energy by sentient machines in a dystopian future. The film uses bullet-time to represent moments in which the rules of the digital world are bent by characters that know how to manipulate them. Complex bodily actions, frequently involving martial arts, are greatly slowed down or halted completely, the camera seeming to circle them at an incredible speed, giving the impression that the spatio-temporal fabric of the world is extremely flexible. The effect was created through the use of several hundred cameras in a greenscreen studio, all encircling the point of action, each one filming a frame in turn, and with the entire rig set up to record the equivalent of one thousand frames per second. These images were then composited with further intermediate digital images, allowing the footage to appear as though it is an impossibly fast and smooth camera track around a decelerated action, such as a body leaping through the air. Stunts were therefore performed in isolation against an abstract background rather than in situ (on set or location) and virtual sets were created separately from photographic references and composited within and behind the human forms (Fordham, 2003: 86). By these means, bullet-time breaks down and re-composes space in order to facilitate its fluid visual navigation.

John Gaeta, a special effects technician on The Matrix, suggests that there is an essential affinity between bullet-time and Eadweard Muybridge’s photographic studies of motion (Magrid, 1999). In the latter, produced in the 1870s and 1880s, an array of cameras recorded the movements of animals and people, generating a sequential series showing, for instance, that all four of a horse’s legs leave the ground during a gallop, or revealing the precise physical actions by which a man removes his hat. These images are presented as highly controlled representations of atomized movement: motion is tamed and quantified by science. As Tim Cresswell (2006: 62-3) shows, Muybridge’s use of rulers (and later grids) in the backgrounds of these images lent them a tone of scientific validity. By extracting a subject, be it a horse or a human, from their normal environment and placing them within a seemingly neutral space, these studies asserted their status as rational abstractions of things immeasurable to the naked eye. Though the spaces in which bullet-time occurs in The Matrix are not so neutral, they are nonetheless generated using similar processes of abstraction, as bodily movement is sequentially mapped and composited with a separate, digitally produced space (Figure 1). 

(Figure 1 HERE [both Figure 1a and Figure 1b])





Bullet-time’s compositing of profilmic performers with digital environments can lead to a sense of disturbance between the corporeality of the body and the symmetry and ‘digitality’ of the rest of the image (Purse, 2013: 44). In The Matrix, real data is computerized and rendered into a digital environment, within which the human figure does not quite fit. Addressing these potential deficiencies, the effects team that worked on bullet-time used so-called virtual cinematography for sequels to The Matrix. In virtual cinematography (a technique with a long history in film, video gaming and advertising – see Jones, 2007; Gurevitch, 2010), data collected from profilmic reference points (be they spatial or bodily) is converted into digital data that can be re-engineered by special effects technicians and filmmakers. Digital reproductions of spaces are generated, and notional camera movements are then plotted within this environment. Virtual cinematography is often intercut with shots that do use profilmic actors or locations, and the transition is intended to be relatively smooth, with virtual cinematography used to accomplish a camera movement or physical action that would not be possible within real space. Moreover, neither the camera nor bodily movements have to be orchestrated at the time of shooting: creating an animated virtual space, virtual cinematography allows camera movements to be plotted and shots to be composed and re-composed in post-production.​[1]​

Instead of filming an actor performing the scene or movement in front of a greenscreen and inserting this footage into another environment, virtual cinematography computerizes performances using a process known as motion capture, or ‘mo-cap’, producing manipulable digital doubles of performers (sometimes called digital stunt doubles or synthespians). Mo-cap involves actors performing on an empty set surrounded by cameras while wearing a skintight suit fitted with highly visible markers. These markers ‘establish a series of vertices in three-dimensional space, and the cameras capture only this vertex data’ (Prince, 2012: 120). This information is ‘applied to a virtual 3-D body, which is then instantly mapped onto a kind of digital puppet’ (Balcerzak, 2009: 196). This puppet is then manipulated as required, the original captured data retained, modified or discarded as necessary.​[2]​ Furthermore, an actor’s face will often be filmed with several dozen small cameras as it contorts into a variety of expressions (a process sometimes called ‘universal capture’, or ‘u-cap’), this data then used to composite a programmable face which is applied to the digital double created by mo-cap. Through these processes the body is reduced to a series of mapped points that are collected and subsequently manipulated through digital means, filmmakers able to swap out, extend, adjust or transform the mo- and u-cap data to create the kind of performance the shot demands. 

Though it captures visual data of spaces and subjects using photography or digital video recording, virtual cinematography virtualizes this visual information, interpolating a full space and a total body from fragments, which can then be animated in a process quite separate from the original period of shooting. The virtually cinematographed image therefore, as Jenna Ng proposes, ‘does not engage with the physical world in the way that the film image does’ (2007: 179). Lev Manovich (2006) similarly asserts that virtual cinematography should be understood as not just different to profilmic cinematography, but also as a different order of image production than computer graphics. It creates, he suggests, ‘self-contained micro-worlds’ (Manovich, 2006: 33), pulling reality apart and systematically reassembling it to generate images that have a cinematographic ‘appearance and level of detail yet internally [are] structured in a completely different way’ (Manovich, 2006: 33). The same process occurs at a bodily level: the procedure of mo-cap may or may not retain an actor’s ‘aura’ (Balcerzak, 2009: 211), but their onscreen presence is qualitatively different. The body becomes highly manipulable, the vertex data of its constituent parts malleable in ways that are nonetheless unified by the movement of the notional camera. In virtual cinematography, then, both space and the bodies populating it have been quantified and substituted in a manner that makes their presentation quite different from their profilmic alternatives.

Abstraction, efficiency and Taylorism 

The full technological mapping and reproduction of indexical space that virtual cinematography enacts positions it alongside Lefebvre’s descriptions of abstract space, the default method of spatial production in capitalist states. Because of its overwhelming presence in our lives, abstract space can be difficult to identify, although motorways and shopping malls are paradigmatic: concreted, geometrically ordered and designed for the circulation of commodities, these are the most overt traces of a spatial logic that defines our places of dwelling, work and leisure in a capitalist society (Lefebvre, 1991: 50). Abstract space functions according to Enlightenment principles that are the foundations of scientific and social existence, and which assert that the world can be objectively known and scientifically ordered. These laws themselves operate through abstraction: they are removed from bodily experience, codified and communicated in language and equations which are then taken to be sites of meaning instead of interpretations of lived conditions. Capitalism necessitates the spatial application of these abstractions in order to conceive of space as a commodity and enter it into commercial systems of equivalence. In allowing social and mental life to be dominated by such disembodied spatial constructs, Western culture has for Lefebvre disregarded the importance of space in all human experience. In doing so, it has surrendered a critical battleground for social improvement. Space is perceived within capitalist societies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as isotropic, homogenous and unchanging, and in this way is surrendered to ruling powers. It cannot be altered, only moved through.

This understanding of space has consequences not just for our actions, but for our mental processes as well. Space ‘commands bodies’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 143), decides the activities that can occur within it, and prescribes and proscribes the routes available all in quite literal ways through its concrete materiality. Using means of technology and planning, abstract space ‘introduces a new form into a pre-existing space – generally a rectilinear or rectangular form such as a meshwork or chequerwork’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 165), which is then used as an organizing principle. Whatever natural, felt or intangible qualities space previously had are overridden, and in this way space is dominated and becomes ‘closed, sterilized, emptied out’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 165). This is generally unnoticed, since sterilization contains within it an air of neutrality, despite the fact that abstraction is inherently violent: abstract space privileges the optical, destroying felt and tactile impressions and imposes the rational upon the real in a process that occurs ‘by means of tools which strike, slice and cut – and keep doing so until the purpose of their aggression is achieved’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 289). The intelligibility abstract space appears to have – thanks to its reliance on grids, signs and predictability – is in truth a trap, concealing the dehumanizing effects of life within contemporary capitalism beneath a veneer of instrumental usability (Lefebvre, 1991: 76).​[3]​

This space marginalizes the unexpected. It has ‘the flatness of a mirror, of an image, of pure spectacle under an absolutely cold gaze’ (Lefebvre, 1991: 287). In such comments Lefebvre demonstrates his allegiance with the Situationist International, a group whose overarching project was to return chance and unpredictability to urban life (Debord, 1955), traits increasingly threatened by the dominance of abstract space (Stevens, 2007: 11). In an excessively ordered, technocratic urban space the opportunity for spontaneous action is curtailed because it is not productive. Abstraction works toward the goal of efficiency, minimizing wasted space and time.

It is not only space that is subjected to procedures of abstraction and standardization: the body, too, becomes increasingly studied and rationalized in ways that are explicitly profit-centered. The work of Michel Foucault (1979) on the disciplining procedures of the nineteenth century are well known, but Lefebvre (1991: 204) in particular singles out Taylorism for its reduction of the body to machinic entity. Through the study of bodily movement in factories in the early twentieth century, Taylorism sought to transform habitual human movement into ‘a rigorous and scientifically coded abstraction of human motion’ (Cresswell, 2006: 86). Defining the correct ways for the human body to accomplish tasks in the most efficient manner possible, Lefebvre describes Taylorism as indicative of the fragmentation or ‘breaking-into-pieces’ of the body in contemporary society (1991: 204). It deconstructs the body into collection of unconnected parts and installs a pathology of fragmented, ocular-centric perceptions where once there was the possibility for embodied, innovative and improvisatory knowledge. Taylorism analyzes movement by making it abstract and generates out of this abstraction an ideal set of actions to achieve a task in the most efficient manner. In doing so Taylorism tames the gestures and possibilities of the body and redesigns them to serve capital. Lefebvre (1991: 406) distrusts this process as for him the body is precisely that which cannot be reduced by and to analytical thought: it is both subject and object in ways that cannot be conceptually divided, and is the locus of meaning for each of us in a manner that may be denied but cannot be eradicated. The body and the senses are holistic sites of truth, meaning and experience, not producers of codified actions; yet Taylorism, and economically-geared action in general, subjects them to the same abstractions as those Lefebvre suggests afflict space.

Brawling in virtual space 

Jonathan Beller explicitly links the abstractions and efficiencies of Taylorism to cinema, suggesting that cinema itself is a similar tool for programming and standardizing sets of movements or social practices. He proposes that the ‘rationalized and instrumental orchestration of stimulation [that is cinema...] arises simultaneously with the rationalized and instrumental orchestration of movement’ typified by Taylorism (Beller, 2006: 132). The cinematic image further realizes the practices of abstraction already associated with the commodity form, Beller goes on, and transforms these into even more effective tools for ‘regulating both individual and social relations’ (2006: 244). In contemporary cinema, the use of CGI has become a particularly acute site of this transformation. Labour-intensive and expensive, digital special effects implicate their viewer ‘in a whole system of contemporary consumer manufacturing and consumption’ (Gurevitch, 2010: 374), selling, as they do, the potential for technology and capital to reproduce space in a manner that is both ‘realistic’ and that provides visual pleasure in the form of spectacle. The totalized knowledge that virtual cinematography relies upon appeals even more directly to the abstracting operations of Taylorism: profilmic content is broken down into a variety of subdivided attributes that can be independently manipulated. This process proclaims that space and its inhabitants cannot only be reduced to abstract data, but that this data can then be used to recreate space in a manner that enters it into the transactional economy of digital visual spectacle described by Gurevitch (2010). The confidence that virtual cinematography possesses in its reconstructions can be demonstrated by a close analysis of The Matrix Reloaded, a film whose production marked a showcase for the technique, and which therefore operates as a valuable site to examine the reasons for and consequences of the spatial and bodily replacements it performs.

A sequel to The Matrix, in The Matrix Reloaded digital technologies are similarly applied to depict and greatly extend protagonist Neo’s own abilities. Their use further underlines the correlation between spatial mapping and spatial mastery, virtual cinematography creating a comprehensive and controlled environment through which Neo’s mo-capped digital double can move with speed and grace. As in The Matrix, cutting-edge computer-assisted methods are employed to both provide visual spectacle and to extend ideas regarding the capacity of digital animation to mimic the real world. The first extended use of the technique in the film is a sequence known colloquially as the ‘burly brawl’ (North, 2005: 52), in which Neo is confronted by his old enemy Agent Smith, a program in the Matrix who no longer obeys central commands and who now has the ability to copy himself by taking over the bodies of others. Neo is able to fight against Smith when his own body is threatened, and this is the cue for the brawl, as dozens and then hundreds of Smiths try to overpower and assimilate Neo.





Such shots showcase the possibilities of virtual cinematography even as they also demonstrate the skills that Neo now possesses. More pertinently, the way the notional camera positions itself in relation to the action works explicitly to emphasize the fullness of this virtual space: its complete knowability and navigability, by both Neo and the technology that is depicting his prowess. In an early piece of writing on computer-generated effects, Vivian Sobchack considers electronic or digitally created spaces to defy ‘traditional geographical description’ (2001[1980]: 233); but in their creation and plotting of space using Euclidean cartographic methods within an isotropic environment they might be better understood as spaces of nothing but geographical description. In virtual cinematography a consequence of this computerized mapping is the removal of organic elements, including the profilmic human body. This joins up with the themes of the franchise: as Dan North proposes, within the narrative of the films, to ‘succeed in the Matrix (that is, to acquire the skills required to manipulate its environs spatio-temporally) is to render one’s body cinematic, to abstract oneself subjectivally from those around you’ (2005: 56). Neo’s body is, however, not rendered cinematic so much as it is quite literally rendered digital(ly). His abstraction occurs when he pushes the limits of his capacities within the virtual space of the Matrix, at which point he and the space become synonymous digital creations: they are both programmable, abstract and highly (even ostentatiously) navigable. In another context Jessica Aldred suggests that prolonged shots of virtual cinematography such as this ‘function to preserve the sense of a unified, subjectively experienced digital play space more readily associated with that of the video game than with cinema’ (2006: 161). Mike Jones (2007: 232) also links the virtual camera with gaming, and proposes that though in its cinematic form the virtual camera does not have the unpredictable (that is, user-directed) movement it possesses in gaming, it nonetheless retains these ideas within its aesthetic and its similar mode of production. By contrast, this article proposes that virtual cinematography within The Matrix Reloaded can be interpreted as denying unpredictability and any possibility of spatial ‘play’.





As shown, Lefebvre suggests that Taylorism is indicative of general cultural changes towards the recording and standardization of bodily movement in ways that rob it of its uniqueness and life. This finds a clear expression in the way contemporary digital effects, such as those employed in The Matrix Reloaded, collect data regarding body shape and movement using mo-cap sessions. The body, then, is used as a vehicle to collect spatial data points which are subsequently programmed to construct a digital body more spectacular and controllable than the profilmic body being replaced. As Lefebvre describes Taylorism to do, the human body is ‘disdained, absorbed, and broken into pieces by images’ (1991: 201), replaced here by a digital surrogate. In an article in Film Quarterly, Jean-Pierre Geuens suggests that this makes the onscreen body into a resource open to manipulation: 

the integrity, grace, and dimensionality of a human body responding to the surrounding living environment is systematically leveled as its body parts are forced to perform independently of one another just like any other raw material that is mined and apportioned with cold and calculated efficiency. (Geuens, 2004: 23)

This body is fragmented and reassembled in a controllable form, much like the space in which it is situated. It becomes totally known, digitized to suit the milieu of virtual cinematography, as a reading of Lefebvre suggests it must be: the space of state control, being for him ‘optical and visual’ (2009b: 234), is not a space in which the body can survive. The body is instead ‘only represented, in a spatial environment reduced to its optical components’ (Lefebvre, 2009b: 234, emphasis in original).





The bodies and the spaces of The Matrix Reloaded, then, indicate the traces of their sporadic digitization even during moments in which they are acted by real performers, and shot in profilmic environments. This is, in the narrative of the franchise, evidence of the artificiality of the Matrix program, and Neo’s ability to play by, and exceed, its spatio-temporal rules. However, the crucial point under consideration is that these traits establish virtual cinematography as an expression of abstract space in a manner that extends far beyond the nefarious diegetic computer simulation. North may be able to suggest that virtual cinematography ‘offers a utopian idea of a type of cinema without indexical and practical constraints’ (2005, 60), its liberated movement demonstrating ‘Neo’s empowerment as a virtualised body free from the gravitational, physical restrictions of the real world’ (2005: 60), yet this is only an idea. Virtual cinematography is in its actual production highly instrumental and proscribed, abstracting space and bodies from real existence, recreating them as literal substitutions that are more manageable and manipulable. In this way it suggests that all contemporary space is inherently, or at least potentially, open to such abstraction.

Living in abstract space

For Jonathan Crary, the breakthrough of Muybridge’s first photographs of horses in motion in 1878 was their depiction of a kind of perception not possible with the human eye alone, and their arrangement of this perception in an abstract fashion ‘outside the terms of any subjective experience’ (2001: 140). Though bullet-time has frequently been compared to Muybridge’s photographs in its reliance upon an array of cameras filming sequential frames (Crockett, 2009: 120–1; Purse, 2009: 223–5; North, 2005: 54), it is in the technique of virtual cinematography that the updating of this abstracted experience of non-subjective spaces and objects becomes more acute. If Muybridge’s work in the late nineteenth century ‘announces a vision compatible with the smooth surface of a global marketplace and its new pathways of exchange’ (Crary, 2001: 142), then virtual cinematography in the early twenty-first proclaims prevailing conditions of continued spatial abstraction through its form of vision that can map and vector space, and furthermore is able to reproduce it in a more fungible, instrumental form. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) are further telling examples of how space is today mediated and transformed, the world reduced to a readable schematic the purpose of which is more convenient navigation.

Producing a space consisting solely of images, triangulated from data points, virtual cinematography can be understood as reducing our sensorial connection with the non-cinematic and more-than-visual spaces of our everyday lives, a consequence that Sobchack (2004: 154) identifies in electronic or digital image production. Digital effects, something of an extension and intensification of cinema itself, are in this way both symptom and metaphorical expression of the disconnection from real space that alienation, globalization and the commodity fetish are thought to engender (Friedberg, 1993: 111–25; Cubitt, 2005: 346–7). The ‘theoretically unlimited number of shooting angles’ (North, 2005: 52) that virtual cinematography provides generate an impression of spatial fullness that is divorced from embodied spatial experience. 

Like Muybridge’s photographs and the visualization of the world through GIS and GPS technologies, virtual cinematography quantifies space and bodies as manageable entities. The precise point of such quantification is to remove the unpredictable, dehumanizing spaces and bodies through their scientific ordering and re-composition. As Eric S. Faden (2001) points out, calculated composition of images has been a fundamental condition of cinema since its inception, as evinced both by Muybridge’s work and the actualities of the Lumière brothers, which were carefully framed for maximum visual activity. Studio sets and the star system remain proven methods for removing contingency and the unexpected, generally focusing the attention of the viewer upon narrative rather than chance details (Faden, 2001: 104–5). Virtual cinematography, however, works to remove all contingency and chance, at the levels of both space and the body.​[4]​ In severing clear indexical links with both the fictional spaces and the characters depicted, virtual cinematography can be placed alongside technologies which enframe the world and promulgate an ‘ideology of abstraction and detachment’ (Gregory, 1994: 65). In this way it too furthers the decorporealization (and privileging) of vision that such enframings make possible.







Virtual cinematography is a form of digital animation that, as it is used in The Matrix Reloaded, announces itself as a more navigable, more spectacular version of space, one that is moreover populated by digitized inhabitants who are more fluidly malleable than their profilmic counterparts. In contrast to fully animated feature films, the capacity of digital animation to act as a replacement for material space is emphasized, as the sequence analyzed cuts back and forth between the two forms of space. This idea of substitution has been examined here in a particularly spatial context in order to provide an alternative and additional register for discussion of digital animation in feature films than that offered by analyses of digital actors or synthespians (although it has been noted that these digital doubles are necessary inhabitants of virtually cinematographed spaces). Substituting profilmic material space with a digitally animated replacement is a form of spectacle and, in a related fashion, a method for overcoming the physical restrictions of filming with a camera apparatus; but, more than this, such substitution has consequences for the perception and meaning of the space presented.
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^1	 Notes Information on this process can be found in Fordham (2003: 87).
^2	  On the King Kong (Peter Jackson, 2005) Region 2 DVD, the ‘production diary’ featurette called ‘Bringing Kong to Life: Motion Editing’ explicitly indicates the possibility for digital animators to consider the mo-cap data as optional, rather than compulsory. This is especially true of action sequences and other moments of excessive athleticism.
^3	  As these traits suggest, abstract space is something of the spatial equivalent of the money economy as described by Georg Simmel (1990[1907]).
^4	  In this, virtual cinematography can be seen as an expression of Sean Cubitt’s (2005: 224) neobaroque cinema, an architectural and geographical form of image-making in which narrative is devalued in favour of totalized spatial organisation.
^5	  Crary’s point of reference is Foucault (1979: 184).
